I. Introduction Hegel's political philosophy is best understood as being both moderate and critical in character. While the recent scholarship is partially correct in its “centrist-reformist” image of Hegel's political philosophy, I argue that this image is incomplete. Hegel's project in the Philosophy of Right is moderate in the respect that it is a defense of his conceptualization of the modern state—it is the attempt to make explicit the implicit rationality of the modern state form. But his prescient critique of (...) the intractable contradictions of the open capitalist market and his identification of civil society with…. (shrink)

The problem of unhappiness is deceptively simple. It is all pervasive, and susceptible to highly theoretical formulations and explanations. In this work, Martin Kalin explores and evaluates two theories which compete as explanations of human unhappiness. Marxism is a utopian theory, in that Marx’s identification of the sources of unhappiness predicts their removal, or at least their radical diminution. Man’s alienation from his work and from his own species is necessary for pre-capitalist and capitalist historical developments. But communist society (...) arises out of that revolution which overcomes precisely those historical conditions which cause alienation. Thus Marx holds that human unhappiness can be and will be overcome in human history. But Marx’s theory has difficulty accounting for the revolutionary forces which will bring this about. And more, Marx’s concept of man includes the notion that human powers are always adequate to human needs. Freudian psychoanalysis especially questions this last point. (shrink)

This book is an interesting entry in the vast and ever expanding field of secondary literature on Hegelian ontologically grounded analysis of the relationship between theory and praxis. It is interesting and slightly unusual for it neither treats Hegel simply as the predecessor of Marx nor does it ignore the more contemporary problems of political philosophy arising from the Hegelian heritage. There is a balance between erudition and speculation and the thorough study of the texts always remains firmly subjected (...) to the broader problems of a philosophy of praxis. This book offers a general interpretation of Hegel and a judgment on the very locus of Hegelianism in the history of modern philosophy. Finally, one should not forget to commend the excurses: there are a number of them, they are short and concentrated, and some of them quote from unpublished student notes taken at Hegel's lectures.--M. J. V. (shrink)

It was bound to happen that Hegel's thought, like that of so many other great philosophers, would be studied from the viewpoint of the question of language. The title is innocent and modest and it seems to promise a monograph on a particular topic. Instead, however, we are led through a number of major Hegelian themes, taken from the totality of his opus. There are chapters on transcendence and infiniteness, on praxis, on the figures of self-consciousness, on religion and the (...) state, and finally on language and system and language and thought. And there is, underlying the whole work, an apparent preoccupation to "situate" Hegel with regard to other great thinkers of modern times: Kant, Marx, Kierkegaard and Heidegger.--M. J. V. (shrink)

Markovic draws upon the Zagreb school of Marx-interpretation, as well as on the data of the historical development of socialism in Yugoslavia in his attempt to develop a critical social theory. He constantly opposes the use of Marxian theory as an ideological orthodoxy simply legitimating political practice. And he points out how Marxian social thought may be a means of critically comprehending social processes, as well as a self-critical theory developing in relation to the historical data at whose evaluation (...) it is directed. Markovic insists that critical social theory must take as its subject matter a range of data comprised of contemporary phenomena, the history of such phenomena, and the human evaluations and aspirations which the historical situation engenders. This points up the importance of a theory of man for a critical social theory. Only an adequate theory of man enables social theory to comprehend and evaluate the goals arising from specific social processes. Markovic outlines elements of such a theory of man, as discoverable in Marx. With these guiding ideas, he examines specific themes such as economics and human values, technology, politics as a professional institution, and revolution. Markovic’s examinations valuably illustrate a balanced Marxian approach to social questions. It is argued, for example, that technological innovations must be analyzed in relation both to the concrete economic processes of given societies, and to the human needs operative in those societies. Markovic draws upon the Yugoslav experience to show the concrete nature of such an analysis. The viability of the professional political institution is discussed, with reference to specific productive relations in societies, and the political possibilities thereof. And in the context of a distinction between political and social revolution, he writes with sensitivity and discernment on the concept of revolution in Marx. Problematically, the precise status of a theory of man in a social theory of the Marxian variety remains unanswered herein. But the work stands as highly useful to those interested in non-ideological developments of Marxian social theory.—M.J.D. (shrink)

Hegel's philosophy of history used to be interpreted mainly in terms of what it is supposed to say about the direction and the end of history, yet the central historical category is, after all, the present, "the spiritual midday." True historicity is in the concrete moment--and this is the thesis that so many commentators of the Phenomenology of the Spirit neglect to emphasize. Hence, after a dutiful examination of the concept of history in this first major work of the philosopher, (...) the author engages in a detailed and interesting history of the interpretations of the Phenomenology. From Feuerbach to Rohrmoser, via Marx, Kierkegaard, and Heidegger we see the radiation of this great work; then comes a discussion with Kojève. In this Auseinandersetzung one definitely senses a sort of aversion toward the brilliant French interpreter but even here the historian's objectivity and expository purpose prevail.--M. J. V. (shrink)

Grier attempts a good deal here and succeeds admirably. He gives us, first, a concise but more than adequate history of Marxist ethical theory from the young Marx to the neo-Kantians. This is followed by an overview of philosophy in the Soviet Union, emphasizing the "ambiguous inheritance" of dialectical and historical materialism, and then by a thorough history of Soviet ethical theory in its formative period. From these well-chosen and substantial preliminaries, Grier turns to an elaboration of the basic (...) features and problems of contemporary ethical theory that includes a considered evaluation from both the stance of the student of ethics and that of the intellectual historian. The foregoing is accomplished in four chapters entitled "Ethical Theory and its Object, Morality," "Discussions of Value Theory in Soviet Marxism," "Society and the Individual," and "Historical Progress and Intrinsic Values." All this is followed by a discussion of the impact of Western ethical thought that deals in turns with the contemporary influence of Kant, Hegel, neopositivism, and existentialism. (shrink)

This work exposes the development of Hegel’s political theory from its origins in Hegel’s reading of Sir James Stewart and the composition of the early theological writings, through the Philosophy of Right. Its principle value lies in showing how careful use may be made of Hegel’s earlier writings in interpreting his mature political philosophy. Avineri describes Hegel’s early dissatisfaction with the understanding of the state as an instrument for the protection of private property, and his attempts to develop a concept (...) of ethical community. Developments of the latter notion are seen in the anti-nationalism of The German Constitution, as well as in the theories of property, class, and representation contained therein. Avineri shows the inappropriateness of ascribing to Hegel a political romanticism, regarding either Prussia or Classical Greece. And in his comments on the System der Sittlicheit [[sic]] and the Realphilosophie, he offers detailed and valuable commentary on Hegel’s early concept of labor. He demonstrates here Hegel’s sensitivity to the complex economic reality of modern society, and shows the early Hegel’s ability to describe labor, class divisions, commodity production, money, and alienation in ways remarkably akin to Marx. Here too Hegel’s notion of the state as that which overcomes the private character of production in civil society and constitutes society as an ethical community is seen. (shrink)

This work exposes the development of Hegel’s political theory from its origins in Hegel’s reading of Sir James Stewart and the composition of the early theological writings, through the Philosophy of Right. Its principle value lies in showing how careful use may be made of Hegel’s earlier writings in interpreting his mature political philosophy. Avineri describes Hegel’s early dissatisfaction with the understanding of the state as an instrument for the protection of private property, and his attempts to develop a concept (...) of ethical community. Developments of the latter notion are seen in the anti-nationalism of The German Constitution, as well as in the theories of property, class, and representation contained therein. Avineri shows the inappropriateness of ascribing to Hegel a political romanticism, regarding either Prussia or Classical Greece. And in his comments on the System der Sittlicheit [[sic]] and the Realphilosophie, he offers detailed and valuable commentary on Hegel’s early concept of labor. He demonstrates here Hegel’s sensitivity to the complex economic reality of modern society, and shows the early Hegel’s ability to describe labor, class divisions, commodity production, money, and alienation in ways remarkably akin to Marx. Here too Hegel’s notion of the state as that which overcomes the private character of production in civil society and constitutes society as an ethical community is seen. (shrink)

Arguably, there is no gesture more typical to philosophy than its repudiation, the sense that philosophical endeavor is a symptom of the pathologies or dislocations of everyday life it seeks to remedy. Throughout the nineteenth century—in the writings of the German Romantics, Young Hegelians, Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche—the repudiation of philosophy is a constant. Sometimes this repudiation takes a reflective form in which traditional philosophical claims are translated into another vocabulary, or are deflated ; sometimes alternative methods are adopted (...) that attempt to undermine, explain away, what is thought of as uniquely philosophical; sometimes rhetorical strategies are adopted that aim to bring about a “conversion” in the reader away from philosophy and toward a more fully immanent or existential self-understanding; and sometimes that more everyday self-understanding that is to be the antidote to philosophical reflection is construed as not yet available but would come to be in an ideal or utopian future if particular radical transformations of current practices were accomplished. Apart from Kierkegaard, these attempts typically construe themselves as continuous with the critique of religion, as if philosophy were nothing but religious excess in rational dress, and thus continuous with modernity’s drive toward secularity. Because the stakes of repudiation are inevitably normative—the protest against philosophy for the sake of a more “realistic,” more truly natural or historical, conception of what is rational or good—the critique of philosophy becomes, despite itself, philosophical, burdened with presuppositions it can neither sustain nor forgo. In brief, this is the lesson of Daniel Brudney’s meticulous and patient excavation of the writings of the young Marx. (shrink)

Arguably, there is no gesture more typical to philosophy than its repudiation, the sense that philosophical endeavor is a symptom of the pathologies or dislocations of everyday life it seeks to remedy. Throughout the nineteenth century—in the writings of the German Romantics, Young Hegelians, Marx, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche—the repudiation of philosophy is a constant. Sometimes this repudiation takes a reflective form in which traditional philosophical claims are translated into another vocabulary, or are deflated ; sometimes alternative methods are adopted (...) that attempt to undermine, explain away, what is thought of as uniquely philosophical; sometimes rhetorical strategies are adopted that aim to bring about a “conversion” in the reader away from philosophy and toward a more fully immanent or existential self-understanding; and sometimes that more everyday self-understanding that is to be the antidote to philosophical reflection is construed as not yet available but would come to be in an ideal or utopian future if particular radical transformations of current practices were accomplished. Apart from Kierkegaard, these attempts typically construe themselves as continuous with the critique of religion, as if philosophy were nothing but religious excess in rational dress, and thus continuous with modernity’s drive toward secularity. Because the stakes of repudiation are inevitably normative—the protest against philosophy for the sake of a more “realistic,” more truly natural or historical, conception of what is rational or good—the critique of philosophy becomes, despite itself, philosophical, burdened with presuppositions it can neither sustain nor forgo. In brief, this is the lesson of Daniel Brudney’s meticulous and patient excavation of the writings of the young Marx. (shrink)

Cohen states in the last sentence of his book that his analysis in no way presupposes the controversial labor theory of value. For him, the contradictions of capitalist production result from the fact that its function is to create exchange value. The statements themselves and the fact that they come very late in the book illustrate two distinctive characteristics of the work. First, Cohen espouses what he calls a technological interpretation of Marx. For him, the driving force of history (...) is the steady increase in the capacity of productive forces. Capitalism supersedes feudalism because of its ability to produce more. This technological interpretation of Marx is a theory of history because only certain production relations allow for the development and expansion of productive forces. For example, the levels of production attained by capitalism would be unthinkable within the context of lord and serf. Secondly, it is not really clear that Cohen is defending a theory of history until he formulates the primacy thesis in chapter 6 and elaborates upon it and the rise of capitalism in chapter 7. The primacy thesis states that the production relations of society are explained by the level of development of its productive forces. Cohen seems to dispense with what is often thought of as the philosophy of history in his discussion of the Hegelian roots of Marxism in the first chapter. He proceeds to analyze the distinction between productive forces and production relations and its consequences for the phenomenon of fetishism in chapters 2-5. These first chapters, and some later ones as well, seem to have the property of belaboring at great length elementary problems raised by the preface to the Critique of Political Economy, and Capital as well. For example, in his distinction between productive forces and production relations, Cohen says that the two must not be confused because relations hold between objects while forces are properties of objects. He says that a soldier who guards peasants tilling the soil is not part of the labor power because he fulfills a social rather than an economic need. Then he presents and elaborates upon a list of production relations. Cohen might have avoided the need for such involved analysis if he had clearly delineated the methodological import of his work in the introduction or the first chapter. I refer to his theory of functional explanation. It is, however, only after he has discussed the problem of base and superstructure in chapter 8 that he comes to examine functional analysis in chapters 9 and 10. Since functional explanation is the crux of his defence of Marxism as a theory of history, the reader deserves a more thorough preparation for it in an introduction. (shrink)

Dicke discusses the metamorphosis of Hegelianism in Feuerbach and Marx through an examination of the concept of identity in the three philosophers. He demonstrates the persistence of this concept as a decisive theme in both Feuerbach and Marx, and shows how Hegel's doctrine of identity is transformed and adulterated in the process of adaptation. A primary consequence of Marx's modification of this doctrine is the philosophical sacrifice of the individual to the collective, which has its practical consequences (...) in contemporary communist states.--J. M. W. (shrink)

A thoughtful Christian counter-offensive on the popular interpretation of Marxism as the absolute antithesis of all that is Christian and democratic. The author's explicit intention is to break down the barrier to understanding and communication constituted by that image. He examines the Judeo-Christian heritage of Marxism and traces the influences which led to Marx's estrangement from that heritage. Elements of the heritage which survived the estrangement are then elucidated and the author concludes with an eminently reasonable appraisal of the (...) legitimate points of contact and conflict between the two doctrines.--J. M. W. (shrink)

This is a critical introduction to modern French philosophy, commissioned from one of the liveliest contemporary practitioners and intended for an English-speaking readership. The dominant 'Anglo-Saxon' reaction to philosophical development in France has for some decades been one of suspicion, occasionally tempered by curiosity but more often hardening into dismissive rejection. But there are signs now of a more sympathetic interest and an increasing readiness to admit and explore shared concerns, even if these are still expressed in a very different (...) idiom and intellectual context. Vincent Descombes offers here a personal guide to the main movements and figures of the last forty-five years. He traces over this period the evolution of thought from a generation preoccupied with the 'three H's' - Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, to a generation influenced since about 1960 by the 'three masters of suspicion' - Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. In this framework he deals in turn with the thought of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, the early structuralists, Foucault, Althusser, Serres, Derrida, and finally Deleuze and Lyotard. The 'internal' intellectual history of the period is related to its institutional setting and the wider cultural and political context which has given French philosophy so much of its distinctive character. (shrink)

MEDIEVAL LOGICS LAMBERT MARIE DE RIJK (ed.), Die mittelalterlichen Traktate De mod0 opponendiet respondendi, Einleitung und Ausgabe der einschlagigen Texte. (Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge Band 17.) Miinster: Aschendorff, 1980. 379 pp. No price stated. THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY MARTA FATTORI, Lessico del Novum Organum di Francesco Bacone. Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo 1980. Two volumes, il + 543, 520 pp. Lire 65.000. VIVIAN SALMON, The study of language in 17th century England. (Amsterdam Studies in the Theory (...) and History of Linguistic Science, Series 111: Studies in theHistory of Linguistics, Volume 17.) Amsterdam: John Benjamins B.V., 1979.x + 218 pp. Dfl. 65. Theoria cum Praxi. Zum Verhaltnis von Theorie und Praxis im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert. (Akten des 111. Internationalen Leibnizkongress, Hannover, 12. bis 17.November 1977, Band 111: Logik, Erkenntnistheorie, Wissenschaftstheorie, Metaphysik, Theologie.) Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1980. vii + 269 pp. DM 48. CLASSICAL AND NON-CLASSICAL LOGICS MICHAEL CLARK, The place of syllogistic in logical theory. Nottingham: University of Nottingham Press, 1980. ix + 151 pp. £3.00. A.F. PARKER-RHODES, The theory of indistinguishables. Dordrecht, Boston and London: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1981. xvii + 216 pp. Dfl.90.00/$39.50. NICHOLAS RESCHER and ROBERT BRANDOM, The logic of inconsistency. Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1980. x + 174 pp. f 11.50. MISCELLANEOUS J. ZELENY, The logic of Marx. Translated from the German by T. Carver. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980. xcii + 247 pp. £12.50. FELIX KAUFMANN, The infinite in mathematics. Edited by Brian McGuinness. Introduction by E. Nagel. Translation from the German by Paul Foulkes. Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978. xvii + 235 pp. Dfl 85/$39.50 (cloth); Dfl 45/$19.95 (paper). PAMELA MCCORDUCK, Machines who think. San Francisco: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1979. xiv + 275 pp. $14.95. J. MITTELSTRASS (ed.), Enzyklopadie Philosophie und Wissenschaftstheorie Bd. 1 : A-G. Mannheim, Wien, Ziirich: Bibliographisches Institut, 1980. 835 pp. DM 128. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

David Lewis's modal realism claims that nothing can exist in more than one world or time, and that statements about how something would have been are to be analysed in terms of its counterpart. I first explain why the counterpart relation depends on de re modal statements in an intensional language, so that intuitive properties of similarity relations cannot be used to show that the counterpart relation is not an equivalence relation. I then look at test sentences in (the intensional) (...) natural language, and show that none of them provide compelling evidence that a counterpart semantics is needed. (shrink)

These two texts are fundamental for the understanding not only of Neoplatonism but also of the conventions of biography in late antiquity. Neither has received such extensive annotation before in English, and this new commentary makes full use of recent scholarship. The long introduction is intended both as a beginner’s guide to Neoplatonism and as a survey of ancient biographical writing.